Poland is facing a deepening demographic crisis, marked by a historically low fertility rate and a steadily declining population. Polish news portal Do Rzezcy interviews Dr. Szymon Grzelak, president of the Instytut Profilaktyki Zintegrowanej (IPZIN) and member of the Presidential Family and Demography Council, to discuss why young Poles increasingly do not want children and what factors contribute to this trend.
According to recent data from the Central Statistical Office (GUS), Poland’s fertility rate in 2024 was only 1.099 children per woman, far below the replacement level of about 2.1 needed to maintain the population. In the same year, Poland recorded a negative natural increase of -4.17, meaning that deaths exceeded births by a wide margin. These figures have alarmed demographers and policymakers alike.
Dr. Grzelak points to long-term research showing that young people’s ideal number of children has been declining for over a decade. Ten years ago, teenagers already envisioned fewer than 2.1 children per family — beneath the replacement threshold. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, this ideal has fallen even further: today’s adolescents, if their aspirations were realized, would average only about 1.4–1.5 children per couple. This suggests the actual fertility rate of future generations will be even lower — likely less than one child per couple, he believes.
Interestingly, Grzelak notes a gender difference: young men are slightly more willing than young women to want children, an issue, as both partners must be willing to have kids.
A major part of Grzelak’s explanation centers on how young people are socialized, distinguishing between primary socialization, values and beliefs learned in the family and immediate community, and secondary socialization, influences from peers, media, and broader cultural environments.
Grzelak argues that secondary socialization now begins prematurely because young people are exposed to global influences (especially through social media and the internet) before their core values are fully formed. These influences often undermine traditional family values by promoting individualism, self-fulfillment, and the idea that children are burdens or obstacles to personal freedom and ambitions.
As a result, children in their teens absorb messages that family and parenthood are not meaningful or desirable goals, and many never receive strong positive examples of long-term relationships or committed parenting.
He warns that this “internet value mix” often drowns out messages about the importance of loving, stable family life, sacrifice for others, and lasting relationships. In many adolescents’ lives, media portrayals of independence and self-realization are far more salient than any realistic depiction of family life.
Grzelak identifies several factors that correlate with higher or lower desires to have children, including religious or spiritual engagement, exposure to positive family models (stable, loving families), psychological well-being, and age and maturity. Younger children (around age 11), Grzelak notes, still show higher interest in future families than older teens.
Grzelak believes that to reverse these demographic trends, society must do more to encourage youth to think about long-term life goals, promote positive role models of marriage and parenthood (including both the joys and challenges), and prioritize a greater sense of community over individualism.
He also calls out the current Tusk-led government for replacing the former “Family Life Education” curriculum with a generic “Health Education” program that does not openly address marriage, parenthood, or raising children.
This, Grzelak believes, was a missed opportunity to reinforce family values in schools and help encourage kids to want to have children in the future.
